



MASTER OF SCIENCE IN 
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 
 
 






DO LABOUR MARKET REFORMS PAY OFF? UNEMPLOYMENT AND 





























DO LABOUR MARKET REFORMS PAY OFF? UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN PORTUGAL 
 
 











SEPTEMBER - 2016 
Abstract
The aim of this dissertation is to study the long-run relationship between unemploy-
ment, capital accumulation and labour market variables in Portugal for the 1985Q1-2013Q4
period. We use an ARDL-bounds test model to perform the econometric estimation. We
nd evidence that capital accumulation has been the main driver of long-run unemploy-
ment (NAIRU), whilst labour market variables have played either a negligible or an existent
explicative role. It suggests that Portuguese NAIRU is endogenous relative to capital accu-
mulation. Consequently, we conclude that the labour market reforms proposed by Troika
were inadequate to the Portuguese case as they were based upon a theoretical framework
(exogenous NAIRU model) that was not representative of the Portuguese labour market.
Keywords: NAIRU, Unemployment, Capital Accumulation, Labour Market Institutions,
ARDL, Bounds Test, Post Keynesian Economics
JEL codes: E11, E12, E15, E22, E24
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank my supervisor Professor Bruno Damásio for the careful and incredible guidance.
Diogo Martins Do Labour Market Reforms Pay O? Unemployment and Capital Accumulation in Portugal
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The NAIRU model 3
3 Endogenous NAIRU 5
3.1 Must NAIRU be unique? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 NAIRU long-run variance to demand shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.1 Short-run deviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2 Long-run path dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 NAIRU as a weak attractor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.1 AD in Price-Output space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.2 AD in the Ination-Output Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 Literature Review 13
4.1 The NAIRU model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Critical response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.1 Do time and specication matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.2.2 Capital stock and capital accumulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5 Empirical assessment 17
5.1 Data description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2 Methodology and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2.1 ARDL approach to cointegration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5.2.2 Model selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2.3 Residual and stability diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2.4 Bounds test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.5 Long-run coecients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.6 Bewley transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26




Diogo Martins Do Labour Market Reforms Pay O? Unemployment and Capital Accumulation in Portugal
List of Figures
1 Model Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2 CUSUM Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Estimated Residuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4 Labour Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5 Negative Demand Shock without Hysteresis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 Negative Demand Shock with Hysteresis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7 Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
ii
Diogo Martins Do Labour Market Reforms Pay O? Unemployment and Capital Accumulation in Portugal
List of Tables
1 Unit Root Test - ADF Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3 Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 RESET Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5 Bounds Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
6 Long-Run Coecients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
7 IV Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
9 Composite Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
10 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11 ARDL Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12 Wald Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
13 Unit Root Test - ADF Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
iii
Diogo Martins Do Labour Market Reforms Pay O? Unemployment and Capital Accumulation in Portugal
1 Introduction
In 2011 Portugal signed a memorandum with Troika, an association of the IMF and European in-
stitutions, that committed the Portuguese government to follow a set of political, institutional and
economic policies in exchange for the nancing provided by those international institutions to the
Portuguese state (IMF, 2011).
The Troika memorandum was based upon two policy blocks that were implemented simultaneously:
a rst one, designed to correct the macroeconomic imbalances of the Portuguese economy, namely the
trade imbalance and the high public and private debt to GDP ratios; and a second block, designed to
enhance the long-run output growth, based upon the so called structural reforms.
The structural reforms were mainly devoted to the labour market and to the welfare state. They
included the freezing of nominal minimum wages, the decrease in the value of dismissal compensations
and cuts in the scope and in the amount of unemployment benets and of other social subsidies1.
This set of policy prescriptions, dear to almost all IMF interventions, was inspired in the NAIRU
literature whose appearence is historically situated at the beginning of 1990's. That literature empha-
sises the need for more exible labour markets has a necessary condition to achieve a lower long-run
unemployment rate.
Despite the growing consensus around the failure of the programme in relation to the correction
of the macroeconomic imbalances, since the public and private debt to GDP continued to increase
during the memorandum period, there are still supporters of the economic virtues of the programme
who argue that the structural reforms implemented have created a new institutional framework that
will guarantee lower levels of unemployment in the future.
Given the extensive critical literature that has emerged in the past twenty years , such considerations
are far from being obvious. That critical literature found evidence that labour market institutions play
a minor role in explaining long-run unemployment, whilst aggregate demand, in general, and capital
accumulation, in particular, were its crucial determinants.
Inspired by that line of research, we will study the long-run relationship between unemployment,
labour market institutions and capital accumulation, using an ARDL-bounds test model. It has the
advantage of assessing the existence of cointegration between variables with dierent integration orders.
The application of this econometric model is an innovation compared to the existing with the existent
literature since it has never been used before in this area of research. The period of time under
investigation ranges from 1985 to 2013.
1For an extensive analysis of the measures proposed by Troika and their social and economic implications see ILO
(2013)
1
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My main research question consists of understanding how important the labour market reforms and
capital capital accumulation have been in explaining the evolution of unemployment in Portugal over
the last three decades. If the labour market reforms proved to be crucial to explain unemployment
during that period, the structural reforms contained in the memorandum are correctly designed given
the historical experience of the Portuguese labour market; if the labour market reforms proved to
be irrelevant while capital accumulation proved to be crucial, it is reasonable to conclude that the
memorandum measures were not well designed. Actually, they may have even been harmful to the
long-run unemployment rate, given the negative impact the internal devaluation had on the investment
growth rate.
The thesis is organized as follows: the rst section briey describes the NAIRU model; section
two presents a critical appraisal of the conventional NAIRU model and sets the foundations for an
endogenous NAIRU theory; section 3 briey revises the existing literature about this topic; nally,
section 4 reports the empirical assessment, including the variable denition, the econometric model
and the discussion of the results.
2
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2 The NAIRU model
The presentation of the NAIRU model will rely on the exposition made in Layard and Nickell (1991,
ch 1), a reference book for the NAIRU literature.
The model has an imperfect competition structure in wich capitalists and workers hold some degree
of market power. Payment of the production factors is not technologically determined; it depends on
the bargaining power of each side of the market.
The bargaining behaviour of each part is formalized by the following set of equations:
Price-setting equation:
pwe = β0 − β1u (1)
Wage- setting equation:
wpe = α0 − α1u (2)
where u represent the unemployment rate, p and w the actual price and wage level and peand we
the expected price and wage level. For a graphic representation, see Figure 4 in the Appendix.
Capitalists set the price through a mark-up on the expected nominal wage, a mark-up that is
negatively inuenced by the unemployment level. The mark-up sensibility to unemployment (β1) is
assumed to be weak or even nonexistent. This reects the assumption of a slightly pro-cyclical market
power. Ultimately, when mark-up is insensitive to economic activity, the price setting curve is at and
illustrates a situation of normal cost pricing.
On the other hand, workers set their nominal wages through a mark-up on the expected price level.
Workers market power is inversely dependent on the unemployment level. Expansionary periods are
associated with low unemployment levels and, consequently, with workers' higher bargaining power
and thus higher expected real wages. By contrast, recessions are associated with high unemployment
levels and, consequently, with a weaker bargaining power and lower expected real wages.
The ination rate is constant only if the expectations of the agents were fullled. There is just one
level of unemployment that is able to ensure this condition  designated as the non-accelarating rate
of unemployment (NAIRU)  determined exogenously by the structural conditions of the economy.
Demand shocks move unemployment away from its equilibrium level, giving rise to inconsistent
claims on output. A positive shock makes the sum of the expected shares of capitalists and workers
bigger than the output value. As adjustment mechanism, the ination rate will change such that
unemployment increases, causing a decrease in the workers' bargaining power2. A negative shock
2The relation between ination, output and unemployment will be explained in detaile in the subsection 2.3
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creates the opposite process. The adjustment will continue until NAIRU has been restored. Hence,
NAIRU works as a gravitational centre to the eective level of unemployment and is not inuenced
in the long run by demand shocks. Supply side shocks alone, such as a change in the price of raw
materials or in the institutional structure of the labour market, are able to modify its value.
Under this paradigm, involuntary unemployment is accepted and is attributed to the labour mar-
ket's inability to clear due to supply side frictions, such as the setting of eciency wages (Shapiro and
Stiglitz, 1984), the bargaining power of unions and the mismatch between rms and workers at the
educational and geographical level. This characteristic marks a contrast to the New Classical frame-
work, where the labour market tends to a market clearing position and all unemployment is voluntary
due to the unwillingness of some agents to work at the current real wage (Lucas, 1972).
The NAIRU model was developed under the broader paradigm of New Keynesian Economics.
Generally, this school of economic thought advocates that demand shocks only aect the economy in
the short-run, while price and wage rigidities are in place and there is a trade-o between ination
and unemployment, illustrated by a negatively sloped Phillips curve. However, in the long run the
Walrasian features are restored and the economy shows a self-adusting tendency to the NAIRU. The
Phillips curve becomes vertical, meaning the absence of a tradeo between ination and unemployment.
Demand-led policies are thus useless in the long run, generating only increases in ination and no
impact on output (Mankiw, 1992).
Therefore, the economic policy advice usually focuses on the correction of frictions in the supply
side of the market, deemed to be an essential step towards a lower NAIRU. Two main types of policies
are suggested to reach this goal; those aimed at decreasing the mismatch between workers and rms
and those related to the weakening of the wage-push variables.
The rst types of policies are widely accepted. They include the creation of new educational and
professional programmes provided to workers, which seek to adapt their qualications to the needs
of rms. They also contemplate pin-point targeting procedures, designed to take into account the
heterogeneous characteristics of dierent regions. A better match between the labour supply and the
vacancies provided by rms ensures a lower NAIRU in the long-run (Layard and Nickell, 1991, ch 6).
Wage-push variables are those which inuence the bargaining power of workers. Examples include
union coverage, unemployment benets, minimum wages and dismissal compensations. New Keyne-
sians argue in favour of decreasing wage-push variables in order to achieve a lower long-run NAIRU,
since weaker bargaining power increases workers' willingness to work at lower expected real wages.
Furthermore, they claim that it increases the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium after a
shock. Cuts in unemployment benets and in minimum wages or new institutions that limit the power
4
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of unions are hence the most common policy recommendations (Layard and Nickell, 1991, ch 10).
Several authors have criticized the New Keynesian conclusions extracted from the NAIRU model.
Most of its critics came from Post-Keysenianism, a school of thought which emphasizes the role of
aggregate demand in the determination of output, both in the short and in the long run (King,
2013). They argue that New Keynesians misrepresent the main theoretical contributions of Keynes,
by pointing out the lack of adjustment of prices and nominal wages as the leading justication behind
involuntary unemployment. They state that the New Keynesian explanations are much closer to the
ones propososed by opponents of Keynes, like the classical economist A. C. Pigou (Davidson, 2011).
Stockhammer (2008) argues that the acceptance of the NAIRU concept, that is, the existence of
an unemployment rate below which the conicting claims on output lead to an increase in the ina-
tion, does not imply the adherence to a theory or to a single set of economic policy prescriptions.
In fact, NAIRU is compatible with New Keynesian, Post Keynesian or Marxist schools of economic
thought, depending on the assumptions made about its determination and dynamics. New Keynesian
interpretation is seen just as an implausible special case in which it is assumed that NAIRU is exoge-
nously determined and it is able to impose a self-adjusting trend to current unemployment. If these
premises were not veried, then aggregate demand and capital accumulation, in particular, can play a
determinant role in setting the long-run unemployment rate.
3 Endogenous NAIRU
A critical appraisal of the NAIRU model must challenge its three main assumptions: uniqueness, auto-
matic tendency to equilibrium and invariance to demand shocks. In the following sections, arguments
will be presented against these assumptions and the foundations set for an endogenous NAIRU theory.
3.1 Must NAIRU be unique?
NAIRU uniqueness is implicitly related to the assumed Phillips curve shape. The Phillips curve
relates the change in ination rate - which in turn depends on the real target wage of workers - with
the unemployment rate. If the Phillips curve is negatively sloped in the whole domain, as is usually
assumed in the short-run, each level of unemployment corresponds to a dierent real target wage, so
that there is only one level of unemployment compatible with a constant level of ination. Moreover,
if the Phillips Curve is vertical, as is often assumed in the long-run, the tradeo between ination
and unemployment does not exist at all. Therefore, any attempt of exploring that trade-o by the
government will be unfruitful.
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However, there is profuse empirical evidence contrary to those Phillips curve shapes. Studies
conducted in dierent countries have estimated that the Phillips curve has a horizontal shape for low
and average values of unemployment (Eisner, 1996; Filardo, 1998; Barnes and Olivei, 2003). That
means that NAIRU is not a single point but a range within which unemployment can decrease without
increasing the actual target wage of the workers. Inside that horizontal segment it is possible for
governments to delineate their economic policy to reduce unemployment without the fear of accelerating
ination. Theoretically, the assumption of a Phillips curve with a horizontal segment has already been
adopted by Keynesian and Post-Keynesian authors (e.g. Tobin, 1995; Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007).
3.2 NAIRU long-run variance to demand shocks
3.2.1 Short-run deviations
Mainstream authors concede the existence of NAIRU deviations from its long-term value. This the-
oretical concession is designated by unemployment hysteresis. Hysteresis is a concept taken from the
lexicon of physics, which refers to the persistence of past shocks in future periods. Thus, the concept
of unemployment hysteresis states that the present unemployment can be partly explained by its own
past dynamics.
Hysteresis is mainly justied by the limited power of the outsiders in the bargaining process,
preventing the adjustment of the real wage to its initial value after the shock. Their limited power
is related to the loss of abilities and skills during the period of unemployment, which make them less
desirable for employers, or with labour market characteristics favourable to the bargaining power of
insiders, like the existence of turnover costs (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988).
To illustrate this idea, suppose a negative demand shock associated with a higher level of unem-
ployment in two distinct situations: a rst where hysteresis is absent and a second where hysteresis is
present.
In the rst case, the negative demand shock has no impact on the workers' bargaining power for each
level of unemployment, which graphically means that the wage-setting curve remains unchanged. Then,
it is possible to conclude that the new unemployment level is unstable, since it does not correspond
to the intersection between the price and the wage-setting curves. Its unstable nature is related to
the inconsistent claims over output that are created at that new point where workers are demanding
an income share lower than the equilibrium point because of their weaker bargaining power. That
inconsistency will trigger a downward trajectory in the ination rate which, assuming a conventional
adjustment mechanism in the goods market, will make output increase and unemployment decrease
6
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until NAIRU has been restored - see Figure 5 in the Appendix.
In the second case, hysteresis is present due to the weaker bargaining power of the outsiders.
Within this context, the negative demand shock has an impact on the workers' bargaining power
for each level of unemployment since the proportion of the long-term unemployed possessing weaker
bargaining power will tend to increase sometime after the shock. The insiders will take the chance
to strengthen their bargaining power, causing an increase in the real wage target. Graphically, this
change is given by an upward rotation of the wage-setting curve, reecting an inferior sensibility of
the wage setters to the overall level of unemployment. The magnitude of that rotation depends on
the proportion of long-term unemployed in each period of time. Unlike the rst situation, where the
adjustment in the goods market guarantees the return to the pre-shock unemployment level, in this
case the adjustment will stop at the interception between the new wage-setting curve and the original
price-setting curve, which corresponds to the new short-run NAIRU (Blanchard and Summers, 1986)
- see Figure 6 in the Appendix.
Despite this short-run concession to the endogeneity hypothesis, the long-run NAIRU is still as-
sumed to be exogenous. The argument is the following: as long as the long-term unemployed exert
some inuence over the determination of wage claims - which is assumed to be a reasonable assumption
for its proponents - it is just a matter of time until they can make wage claims return to the initial
level, which is graphically given by a downward rotation of the wage-setting curve until presenting
its original slope again. When this happens, the short-run NAIRU ends its convergence path towards
long run NAIRU. The latter is totally exogenous and only changeable by supply side factors (Nickell,
1998).
3.2.2 Long-run path dependence
In contrast, Post-Keynesian economics argues that the potential GDP, and so NAIRU, are determined
by the past and present behaviour of aggregate demand (AD). That is, the potential GDP is path
dependent in relation to AD. As examples, we will mention the impact of aggregate demand on three
supply side elements: long run capital to output ratio, labour force growth rate and technological
progress. The following arguments are summarized in Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007).
Long-run Capital to output ratio: In the short-run, an increase in aggregate demand increases
the utilization of the capital stock. If the capital utilization is high, it may create an incentive to
increase investment, since companies want to increase their production capacity to match growth in
demand. In the long term, this process leads to a higher capital to output ratio, increasing potential
output. Instead, if the aggregate demand is low, there is greater spare capacity. Judging that the
7
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installed capacity is sucient to meet the future demand rises, companies may reduce their investment
causing a decrease in the capital to output ratio and in the potential output (e.g. Cornwall, 1972).
Additionally, an increase in AD can stimulate investment via increased retained prots because it raises
the internal nancing capacity of companies. Using Kalecki's words: (. . . ) investment decisions are
closely related to internal accumulation of capital, i.e. to the gross savings of rms. (Kalecki, 1971).
Labour force rate of growth: When demand shocks are long and severe, causing high levels of
unemployment during several years, they can lead to signicant migration of workers who leave their
home countries in search of work abroad. As most of these workers are adults of childbearing age, the
birth rate tends to lower in the countries of origin, causing a decrease in the potential labour force
growth rate and, consequently, in the potential output.
Techonological progress: AD can positively interfere in technological progress for at least two
reasons. First, the expansion of demand can intensify the eects of learning by doing associated with
the need to meet a higher level of production. Secondly, a high AD creates the need for companies to
seek technological innovations that make them more ecient to meet the increasing production volume
despite their limited level of resources. Moreover, higher eciency and innovation may cause further
expansion of new markets, in a process called dynamic increasing returns to scale. As classically stated
by Joan Robinson, (...) technical progress is being speeded up to keep up with accumulation. The
rate of technical progress is not a natural phenomenon that falls like the gentle rain from heaven.
When there is an economic motive for raising output per man the entrepreneurs seek out inventions
and improvements. Even more important than speeding up discoveries is the speeding up of the rate
at which innovations are diused. When entrepreneurs nd themselves in a situation where potential
markets are expanding but labour hard to nd, they have every motive to increase productivity
(Robinson, 1956, p. 96).
The above arguments have been received with scepticism for many years by mainstream economists.
That should not be surprising since the long-run output invariance to demand shocks had been con-
sensually assumed as one of the mainstream cornerstones of economics (Solow, 1997).
However, upon the appearance of the Great Recession, economists have recently become more open
to accepting the path dependence hypothesis. Assessing the impact of the global nancial crisis in a
sample of 23 countries, Ball (2014) concluded that (. . . ) shortfalls of actual output from pre-recession
trends have reduced potential output almost one-for one; and, in the same sense, Ceretti and Summers
(2015) found evidence from a sample of over 120 recessions that about two-thirds of them have led to
a permanent gap between the previously estimated potential output and the after-recession estimate.
They present this evidence under the concept of super hysteresis which, in practice, corresponds to
8
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the acceptance of long-run eects of AD on potential output.
At the end, we should make clear the importance of these arguments to the NAIRU theory: if
we take as valid the assumption of the long-run path dependence of potential output in relation to
AD, that means that there is no such thing as a single and exogenous NAIRU. Given that NAIRU is
derived from the potential output and this output is determined by past behaviour of AD, NAIRU is
fully endogenous and its values heavily depend on the way AD was managed made in the past.
Capital accumulation: a particular case After presenting a set of arguments in favour of the AD
impact on long-term growth and therefore on NAIRU, the exposition will now focus on a particular
component of AD, investment, and on capital stock.
According to Keynesian thinking, investment volatility is the main determinant of unemployment
dynamics in the short and long-run (Keynes, 1936). In opposition, NAIRU literature argues that long-
run unemployment is invariant in relation to capital accumulation (Layard and Nickell, 1991). We
now argue that capital accumulation introduces demand and supply side transformations that make
NAIRU endogenous to investment, favouring the Keynesian thesis.
First, as Robert Rowthorn convincingly argues, the invariance of NAIRU to capital accumulation
is merely a consequence of a particular kind of production function specication (Rowthorn, 1999).
Layard and Nickell (1991) utilizes a Cobb-Douglas production function, whose value of the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labour (ε) is, by denition, equal to 1, meaning that capital and
labour are perfect substitutes. Furthermore, they assume that any increase in labour productivity will
be fully reected in real wages. Under these assumptions, suppose that there is an increase in capital
stock which, in turn, increases the marginal productivity of labour. If everything else stayed constant,
it should lead to an increase in the demand for labour and, consequently, to a corresponding increase
in employment. However, because we are assuming ε=1 and that any increase in productivity will be
fully reected in real wages, the increase in productivity will be exactly oset by the increasing wage
costs. It creates a change in employment symmetric to the one caused by the increase in capital stock.
It turns out that the employment level seems not to be sensitive to changes in capital stock.
Although ingenious, this narrative is not backed up by the facts. Empirically, the values of ε are
signicantly far from one. Out of a total of 33 econometric studies, in only 7 cases does the summary
value exceeds 0.8, and the overall median of the summary values is equal to 0.58 (Rowthorn, 1995).
Complementarily, Manning et al. (1992) and Elmeskov (1993) found evidence that labour productivity
is, in fact, a weak explanatory variable for the evolution of real wages.
So, taking into account the empirical evidence, we can tell a quite dierent story. If the adjustment
9
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of real wages to productivity is only partial and the substitutability between capital and labour is
inferior to 1, it means that the net creation of employment caused by capital accumulation is positive,
making NAIRU endogenous.
Furthermore, capital accumulation decreases the pressure on ination for two reasons. The rst is
related to the process described above: if the real wages do not fully adjust to productivity changes,
then the proportion of wage claims over total output becomes smaller. Second, a similar process occurs
on the capitalists side. The increasing capital stock increases spare capacity, which is assumed to have
an inverse relationship with the mark-up set by rms. A smaller mark-up means a minor proportion of
prot claims over total output. Both eects increase the level of real wages compatible with constant
ination which, consequently, is consubstantiated in a lower NAIRU (Rowthorn, 1995).
3.3 NAIRU as a weak attractor
As was stated above, New Keynesians see NAIRU as a strong attractor to actual unemployment. The
root for this result rests in the adjustment mechanism in the goods market which, in turn, is related
to the AD shape.
AD is usually displayed in two distinct spaces: Price-output and Ination-output spaces. The
former has little expression in contemporary research, but remains the representation presented in
most introductory and intermediate textbooks which justies our explanation and critical appraisal.
The latter is the contemporary dominant view and it is a crucial assumption of the New Consensus
Macroeconomics (NCM) (Romer, 2000).3.
3.3.1 AD in Price-Output space
The three main factors behind a negatively sloped AD in the price output space are broadly known
and can be found in any introductory textbook (e.g. Bernanke et al., 2015 and Mankiw, 2014). The
rst is related to the eect of ination on money demand. Higher ination is associated with an
increasing money demand for transactions. Given an exogenous stock of money, it raises the interest
rate and consequently depresses investment and AD. This mechanism is usually called the Keynes eect.
The second is associated with the relation between ination and the real money ballances. Higher
ination will decrease real money balances detained by agents, which decreases the purchasing power
of the current money stock. It is assumed that this decrease in real wealth will negatively inuence
consumption and investment (Pigou eect). The last, and probably least controversial factor, justies
3New Consensus Macroeconomics, sometimes also called Modern Macroeconimcs, is the result of a synthesis between
the New Classical and the New Keynesian schools.
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the reduction of AD through the appreciation of the real exchange rate, worsening the competitiveness
of the economy and decreasing external demand.
Upon accepting the negative slope of the AD, the NAIRU gravitational position appears as a logical
result. If unemployment falls below the NAIRU, ination will have to go up in order to adjust the wage
claims compatible with that level of unemployment. This increase will be accompanied by a decrease
in AD until the new value of the NAIRU is reached. A symmetric process occurs when unemployment
is above the NAIRU. Thus, as long as we assume a downward sloped AD, NAIRU will always be a a
strong attractor to actual unemployment.
But these assumptions have been subjected to stern criticism. The existence of an exogenous
stock of money is a simplifying assumption which has no correspondence in reality. In fact, there is
empirical evidence suggesting that the money supply is endogenous, being inuenced by the dynamics
of aggregate demand, particularly through its impact on the demand for credit, while the interest rate
is exogenous. This hypothesis has long been advocated by post-Keynesian authors (e.g. Kaldor, 1985,
Moore, 1988, Chick, 1973) and more recently by authors coming from NCM (Blinder, 1997). Without
an exogenous money supply, there is no reason either for an increase in AD to cause a rise in the
interest rate or for an inverse relationship between the price level and real money balances, refuting
both eects.
Moreover, the preponderant role of debt in modern economies gives us another reason why the
aggregate demand does not depend negatively on the price level. Known as debtdeation, this eect
emphasizes the negative role that falling prices have on aggregate demand by increasing the real value
of debts and so having a negative impact on consumption and investment intentions of agents (Fisher,
1933). In the context of the Great Recession we are going through, where many countries detain high
private and/or public debts, this eect has to be considered.
3.3.2 AD in the Ination-Output Space
The representation of AD on the ination-output space was initiated by New Keynesian authors and
was later embraced by the NCM. Inside the NCM framework, the Central Bank (CB) adjusts its
interest rate depending on the ination target. Whenever expectations of a growing aggregate demand
threaten the ination goal set by the central bank, it should raise the short-run interest rate in order to
depress the evolution of demand and ination expectations. Therefore, it is the CB reaction function
that imposes a downward slope to AD.
However, we must be aware of two profound dierences between this mechanism and the previously
presented one. Whilst processes illustrated by Pigou and Keynes eects are supposed to be automatic,
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that is, determined by the spontaneous action of the market, the CB's response depends on a deliberate
action of the monetary authority, the absence of which determines the inexistence of the process.
Besides, and even more relevant, the CB's action is not always eective. In the current context of the
Great Recession, central banks face the so-called zero lower bond problem (Eggertsson and Krugman,
2012) and despite seeking to use alternative instruments of monetary policy (e.g. quantitative easing),
their power to inuence aggregate demand has been shown to be limited. In a scenario of the central
bank's diculty/inability to inuence aggregate demand (as is happening now in the Eurozone) there
is no plausible mechanism that makes the AD have a negative slope.
In short, it is not possible to give a conclusive answer regarding the shape of AD curve. During
normal times, with a CB able to inuence output and a low level of public/private debt, it is probable
that AD shows a negative slope. However, during times such as what we are living in, characterised
by high indebtedness and a powerless CB, there is no reason for the AD curve to present that shape
(Stockhammer, 2011), undermining the macroeconomic foundation for a NAIRU that works as a
gravitational centre to economic activity.
3.4 Summary
The previous sections carried a critical appraisal of the conventional NAIRU theory. Furthermore,
arguments were presented for the adoption of an alternative theoretical framework, which can be
labelled as endogenous NAIRU theory or, in the terminology of Arestis and Sawyer (2005), structuralist
view of ination. It has the following stylized characteristics: 1) NAIRU is not unique  there are a
range of unemployment rates in which the ination rate may stay constant; 2) the major supply
side factors that inuence the ination frontier are the conict over income shares and productive
capacity  labour market institutions play a minor role; 3) supply side factors are not independent of
the aggregate demand behaviour. Capital accumulation can inuence the income shares conict and
productive capacity, meaning that aggregate demand can inuence NAIRU in the long-run (Arestis
and Sawyer, 2005).
In conclusion, inside this new framework governments no longer need to accept high levels of
unemployment to prevent rising ination. Alternatively, they may choose appropriate demand policies
to stimulate investment and underpin full employment.
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4 Literature Review
4.1 The NAIRU model
To explore the dierences in unemployment between countries, Layard and Nickell (1991) estimate a
cross-sectional equation including 20 countries during the 1983-1988 period. The group of independent
variables included benet duration, replacement ratio, active labour market spending, coverage of
collective bargaining and the change in ination and all variables proved to be statistically signicant.
Benet duration, replacement ratio and coverage of collective bargaining had a positive impact on
unemployment while active labour market spending had a negative one. Furthermore, it was claimed
that this kind of regression structure is able to explain over 90 per cent of the cross-country dierences
in unemployment. As policy recommendations, they suggest measures such as decreasing the duration
of unconditional unemployment benets, diminishing of employment protection legislation, reforming
the bargaining systems and the design of training programmes to overcome the mismatch between
workers and rms.
In the same vein, Siebert (1997) argues that global competition and technological progress create
the need for a exible labour market taht can adapt to the successive shocks hitting the economy. The
labour protection measures such as barriers to dismissal or the existence of a dismissal compensation are
presented as detrimental for employment, since rms decrease their labour demand because they fear
not being able to lay o workers after a future shock. Social protection measures such as unemployment
benets increase workers' reservation wage, also contributing to a higher equilibrium unemployment
level. Finally, the author makes a brief analysis on the evolution in unemployment in several European
countries, concluding that the faster decrease of unemployment in United Kingdom and Netherlands
was due to their adherence to exible labour market measures.
Nickell (1998) conducted an econometric study covering all the OECD countries between 1964
and 1992. He sought to explain the behaviour of unemployment through seven explanatory variables:
Industrial turbulence, replacement ratio, terms of trade, skills mismatch, union mark-up, tax wedge and
real interest rate. He found a strong long run relationship between unemployment and skills mismatch,
union density and tax wedge. These results are consistent with the NAIRU model predictions.
The conclusions of this research agenda were quickly absorbed by international organizations with
a signicant inuence over policy making. The policy recommendations of the OECD Job Study,
published in 1994, were entirely in agreement with the NAIRU literature published in the preceding
years (OECD, 1994). This study was an important legitimacy source for the labour market deregulatory
reforms implemented by most countries during that decade. The same sort of policy recommendations
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regarding labour market reforms can be found in subsequent institutional reports, like IMF (2003) or
EC (2003).
4.2 Critical response
Although the NAIRU model has become the dominant script for the interpretation of unemployment
in developed economies, its theoretical and empirical foundations have been repeatedly challenged.
The theoretical counterpoint was widely explored in section 2, so will not be discussed again.
On the empirical level, the refutation attempt follows, roughly, two main lines of research. There
is a rst set of authors who investigates the robustness of the institutional variables used by advocates
of the NAIRU model, assessing whether slight modications in the specication of equations or new
choices in the period of analysis have an impact on the signicance of the explanatory variables. They
also seek to assess whether monetary policy generates long-term eects on unemployment, opposing
the conventional notion that their eect would be limited to the short-term. The other line of research
introduces capital accumulation in the econometric specications in an attempt to assess whether the
lack of capital and/or the lack of investment are the main causes of unemployment in the long term.
4.2.1 Do time and specication matter?
Ball et al. (1999) analysed a sample of two groups of countries: a smaller group, consisting on six
of the seven G-7 countries and a larger sample consisting on 17 OECD countries. Both groups have
in common the fact they went through recessions in the early 80's. They noted that the monetary
policy strategy after the recession was decisive for the degree of hysteresis, that is, the degree to
which short-term unemployment aects long-term unemployment (NAIRU). Countries conducting an
easier monetary policy, such as US and Canada, had fast and sustained decreases in their rate of
unemployment without the occurrence of large increases in their ination rates. In contrast, most
European countries chose to maintain a tight monetary policy, a decision that caused higher and more
persistent levels of unemployment. Thus, they concluded: "(...) demand expansions helped reduce the
NAIRU, but the permanent reduction in the NAIRU does not require a permanent rise in ination.
They also report that "the role of labour market reforms in the success stories is exaggerated." Opposing
the conclusions of Siebert (1997), they suggest that the case of Netherlands and UK are just particular
cases unable to validate the success of labour market reforms. In fact, there are a large number of
other countries that have also made these reforms without achieving the same success. In support of
their argument, they allude to Blanchard and Jimeno (1995), where it is claimed that the evolution
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of unemployment in Portugal and Spain is very dierent, even though the type and timing of labour
market reforms are similar.
Ball et al. (1999) set themselves apart from other mainstream analysis on the impact of monetary
policy on the unemployment rate by suggesting that monetary policy has long-term eects. Blan-
chard and Wolfers (2000), for instance, concede that the inuence of labour market reforms has been
overemphasized and that monetary policy may inuence the short-term unemployment but retain
the assumption that long-term unemployment remains invariant to the eect of monetary policy on
aggregate demand.
Howell et al. (2007) criticize the institutional variables construction criteria for being too subjective
and for hiding the lack of homogeneity among the various countries analysed. The gross replacement
rate (GRR), for example, often used as an indicator of the generosity of unemployment compensations,
fails to capture the existing asymmetries in the unemployment benet eligibility criteria in each country.
It is possible that countries with a high GRR have low coverage rates and vice versa. The same
criticism can be directed at the Union Density (UD), since this indicator does not capture the collective
bargaining coverage, that is, the share of employees whose wages and employment conditions are set
through collective bargaining. There are several examples of countries with low UD and very high
levels of collective bargaining coverage, whereby the interpretation of the indicator can be misleading.
They also dispute the causal relationship usually presented. By applying Granger-causality tests,
they found that in 4 countries it is the change in unemployment that causes the variation of the GRR
and not the opposite way round, as usually assumed. This causal relationship is probably explained by
the increase in unemployment benets during times of recession, representing an attempt to diminish
the associated social costs.
In addition, empirical studies performed by OECD and IMF seem to be extremely sensitive to small
changes in the equations specication. Baker et al. (2004) perform minor changes in the three main
specications of IMF (2003), including new variables and interactions between variables generally used
in previous researches on the subject. Statistical evidence changes dramatically: from all previously
signicant institutional variables, only the tax wedge remains signicant at 10% level.
Baccaro and Rei (2005) summarize a set of arguments supporting an alternative view with regard
to the impact of the labour market institutional variables. In particular, they argue that a longer and
generous GRR can increase the likelihood of matching workers and job oers and that employment
protection legislation necessarily has an ambiguous eect, since it reduces both ows from unemploy-
ment into employment and ows from employment into unemployment. Additionally, they test the
robustness of the methods used in Nickell and Nunziata (2001) and in IMF (2003). They apply a wide
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range of alternative specications, using static and dynamic models, annual and average data as well as
a long list of estimation techniques. Like Baker et al. (2004), they nd that the results largely depend
on the model specication and on the estimator used. They conclude that this evidence suggests that
most of these studies are skewed to conrm the starting assumptions of the theory defended by their
authors.
4.2.2 Capital stock and capital accumulation
Capital stock
Inspired by Rowthorn (1995), another vein of investigation tried to empirically refute the interpretation
of the NAIRU story by including capital stock in the econometric studies with the purpose of testing
the hypothesis according to which unemployment in developed economies is mainly due to the lack of
sucient capital to employ the entire workforce.
Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (2000) test this hypothesis for UK and for Germany. They
make a regression of unemployment on expected real wages, union militancy, tax and import costs,
long term unemployment, nominal price inertia and capital stock. They nd that the impact of capital
stock on unemployment prevails above any other factor. Arestis et al. (2007) apply the same regression
to a panel of 9 EMU countries, reaching similar conclusions.
Using the Fully Modied Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) estimator, Palacio-Vera et al. (2011)
performed a similar study, trying to relate unemployment to the generosity of unemployment benets,
the interest rate, the mark-up and the capital-output ratio. All variables, except for the mark-up, were
statistically signicant.
Capital accumulation
In an attempt to test the Keynesian assumption according to which the dynamic of investment is the
main determinant of the unemployment rate, a set of studies have been conducted which include the
growth rate of investment as a regressor, in addition to the usual variables representing the labour
market and the welfare state structures. Unlike the ones presented in the previous section, these studies
focus on the impact of the growth rate of capital accumulation rather than on the capital stock.
Stockhammer (2004) uses the Seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method to study the evolution
of the labour market in the United States and four European countries. He chooses to perform
two estimations with dierent dependent variables: the unemployment rate and the growth rate of
employment. Capital accumulation is consistently signicant in all countries in both specications.
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On the contrary, out of all the labour market variables, only the replacement rate is consistently
signicant with the signal predicted by the NAIRU hypothesis.
Studying the evolution of unemployment in a panel of 20 OECD countries, Stockhammer and Klär
(2010) use as explanatory variables the capital stock growth rate and a set of institutional variables,
such as employment protection legislation (EPL), replacement ratio, benet duration, union density
and tax wedge. They also use controls for several macroeconomic shocks, namely the real interest
rate, terms of trade and the deviation of the total productivity from its trend factor. The data is
structured in 5-year averages to eliminate business cycle uctuations. Out of all the institutional
variables, only UD coecient is statistically signicant with the expected signal. EPL coecient is
statistically signicant but has a sign contrary to what one would expect - increasing EPL has a
negative impact on unemployment. The capital stock growth rate is again statistically signicant at
1% level.
In a more recent paper, Stockhammer et al. (2014) analyse the evolution of unemployment during
the period of the Great Recession (2007-2011). Econometric specications are similar to the ones used
in Stockhammer and Klär (2010) but include a new variable, Housebub, dened as the deviation of the
employment ratio in the construction sector from the global rate of employment, to assess the impact
of the housing bubble in the evolution of unemployment. Again, the only statistically signicant




The data consists of quarterly time-series ranging from the rst quarter of 1985 (1985Q1) to the fourth
quarter of 2013 (2013Q4)4. The model will include six variables: Unemployment rate (U), capital
accumulation (GK), government led employment protection legislation (GEPL), gross replacement
rate (GRR), Union Density (UD) and an external macroeconomic shock (EMS).
The unemployment rate was directly taken from the Bank of Portugal Economic Bulletin (2015).
Following Stochkammer (2004), GK is dened as the logarithm of gross xed capital formation. The
series was also taken from the Bank of Portugal Economic Bulletin (2015).
GEPL is a composite variable computed as the logarithm of the product of the real minimum wage
4Some series are not published on a quarterly basis. In these situations, we use the interpolation methods calculated
by Eviews software. For each case, the chosen interpolation method was the one that better preserved the original series
behavior.
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(RMW ) with the weighted average of the employment protection legislation indicators published by
OECD (EPL) - GEPL = LOG(RMW ∗ EPL). To construct RMW data was extracted from the
nominal minimum wage and divided by the quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI). Both variables
were taken from INE - Statistics of Portugal. EPL was built from two variables published by the
OECD, strict employment protection legislation of regular workers (SEPR) and strict employment
protection legislation of temporary workers (SEPT ). The weights utilized were taken from PORDATA.
They are respectively the proportion of regular workers in the employed population (REGPROP ) and
the proportion of temporary workers in the employed population (TEMPROP ) - EPL =SEPR ∗
REGPROP +SEPT ∗TEMPROP . We decided to build a variable that would aggregate the impact
of employment protection legislation and the minimum wage, since these are the two institutional
variables under the direct inuence of government action.
GRR represents the gross unemployment benet level as a percentage of previous gross earnings.
It is an indicator that intends to measure the generosity of the unemployment benets in each country.
UD corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by
the total number of wage and salary earners. It represents a proxy for the bargaining power of the
workers. Both variables are computed by the OECD.
EMS is calculated as the logarithm of the product of trade openness (TO) with terms of trade
(TOT ) - EMS = LOG(TO ∗ TOT ). This specication of the external macroeconomic shock follows
the past literature on the subject, in line with Baccaro and Rei (2005) . TO is dened as the ratio
between the sum of exports (EX) with imports (IM) divided by the gross domestic product (GDP )
- TO = (EX + IM)/GDP . The values of EX, IM and GDP are taken from the Bank of Portugal
Economic Bulletin (2015). TOT is dened as the ratio between the index of export prices and the index
of import prices and it can be interpreted as the amount of import goods an economy can purchase
per unit of export goods. The variable was taken from the OECD.
GK is a measure of capital accumulation and is included to test for the Keynesian hypothesis.
GEPL, GRR and UD are institutional variables and are included to test for the exogenous NAIRU
hypothesis. EMS is a control variable.
According to the NAIRU hypothesis GEPL, GRR and UD are expected to have a positive long-
run impact on the unemployment rate; GK can inuence unemployment negatively but only in the
short-run. In contrast, the Keynesian hypothesis postulates that GK is the main determinant of
unemployment, having a negative inuence both in the short and in the long-run; it also predicts that
GEPL, GRR and UD should not play a major role in explaining long-run unemployment.
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5.2 Methodology and Results
5.2.1 ARDL approach to cointegration
To assess the long run relationship between unemployment, capital accumulation and the institutional
variables, we will employ the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)  bounds test approach to
cointegration analysis developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran et al. (2001).
The notion of cointegration arose out of the concern about spurious or nonsense regressions in
time series. When a set of variables are integrated of some order, the traditional estimation tech-
niques applied to stationary data are commonly not valid. They generate misleading results as highly
signicant coecients, low values of Durbin-Watson statistic and R squared values that behave like
random variables (Granger and Newbold, 1974). However, it is possible to extract valid conclusions
out of models with non-stationary variables as long as there is cointegration between them. Two sets
of non-stationary I(d) and I(p) variables are cointegrated when exists at least one linear combination
between them which is integrated of order I(d − p), with d > p. When that is the case, it is possible
to conclude the existence of a long-run relationship between the cointegrated variables.
The traditional cointegration approaches such as Engle and Granger (1987) and Johansen and
Juselius (1990) had the disadvantage of requiring that all the variables employed had the same order
of integration. The approach of Pesaran and Shin (1998) overcomes that methodological limitation by
allowing for the use of a mixture of I(1) and I(0) variables in the regression. The model just imposes
that the dependent variable must be I(1) and that none of variables may have an order of integration
higher than one.
Consequently, the rst step is to determine the order of integration of the variables using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test proposed by Said and Dickey (1984). The results are summarized in the
following table:
Table 1: Unit Root Test - ADF Test
Variables Level 1stdierences Conclusion
intercept intercept and trend intercept intercept and trend
U −0.9595 −2.1486 −3.7075∗∗∗ −3.8300∗∗ I(1)
GK −2.2000 −1.1369 −3.2702∗∗ −3.8416∗∗ I(1)
GEPL −3.4264∗∗ −3.3068∗ - - I(0)
GRR −2.5315 −2.5105 −3.8240∗∗∗ −3.7638
∗∗
I(1)
UD −3.40185∗∗ −3.4666∗∗∗ - - I(0)
EMS −1.8689 −1.3067 −12.0915∗∗∗ −12.2216∗∗∗ I(1)
*, ** and *** denote signicance at ten, ve and one percent signicance level. Number of lags chosen by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
As we can observe, there is supportive evidence for the dependent variable (U) being integrated of
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order 1, as well as GK, GRR and CEPL. In contrast, GEPL and UD appear to be stationary. The
order of integration of the dependent variable and the mixture of I(1) and I(0) regressors are supportive
ndings for the use of the ARDL approach.
The ARDL model has the following general form:








jxt + εt (3)
where α0 is a constant, t is a time trend, yt is a dependent variable, xt is a vector of independent
variables, L represents the lag operator and εt is a white noise error term.
5.2.2 Model selection
To determine the optimal lag length of the model, the Akaike informaton criteria (AIC) will be em-
ployed as proposed by Akaike (1974). It can be formally expressed as:
AIC = 2K − 2ln(L) (4)
where K represents the number of parameters of the model and L is the maximised log-likelihood.
The chosen model is the one that minimizes this expression. The criteria simultaneously ponders
the goodness of the t towards the inclusion of L and seeks to avoid the overtting of the model by
introducing a penalty for each additional parameter (K).
We choose to use AIC instead of other information criteria, like Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
or HannanQuinn information criterion (HQC), because AIC is the only one that is asymptotically
ecient. For a proof, see Burnham and Anderson (2002).
The next gure synthesizes the values assigned by AIC criteria to the top 20 models of the selection:
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AIC Criteria (top 20 models)
Therefore, the ARDL model selected according to AIC criterion is presented as follows:











+ δkGEPLt + θlGRRt + ϕmUDt + σnEMSt + εt (5)
where α0 is a constant, t is a time trend, and εt is a white noise error term.
5.2.3 Residual and stability diagnosis
Subsequently, we have to look for the presence of serial correlation in the disturbance term. If the
model shows evidence of serial correlation, that inference is no longer valid since the serial independence
of the error term is a condition for its applicability. A Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
was conducted providing evidence of no serial correlation at 5% level. The summary of the test results
can be checked in the following table:
Table 2: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test
Statistic




F − Statistic and χ2 − Statistic are reported. p− values between parentheses.
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Moreover, a Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test was also conducted to assess the existence of heteroskedas-
ticity. As can be veried in the following table, we may also conclude that there is no evidence of
heteroskedasticity at 5% signicance level.
Table 3: Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey
Statistic




F − Statistic and χ2 − Statistic are reported. p− values between parentheses.
To search for the existence of functional misspecication, the RESET test was carried out as
suggested by Ramsey (1969). The test opposes H0 : ε ∼ N(0, σ2I) to H1 : ε ∼ N(µ,σ2I), µ 6= 0. The
test is based on the general augmented regression y = Xβ + Zγ + ε, where Z includes powers of the
predicted values of the dependent variable. We chose to include two tted terms in the model, such
that Z = [ŷ2, ŷ3]. A summary of the results is presented in the following table:
Table 4: RESET Test
Statistic
F − Stat ∼ F(2,102) 0.2177
(0.8047)
Omitted variables: Powers of tted values from 2 to 3
F-statistic is reported; p− values between parentheses
From the F-statistic critical value, we infer that is not possible to reject the null hypothesis which
suggests no evidence of misspecication from the RESET test.
Finally, we concentrated on the stability of the model. A specication that lacks stability could
be a source of concern. This would mean that the values of parameters would be unstable during
the sample period, which would compromise the explanatory and forecasting power of the model. To
assess it we used a CUSUM test based on the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals (Brown et al.,
1975). For a model that remains stable the cumulative sum will vary randomly around a mean of zero.
Otherwise, if the mean shifts upwards/downwards to some value, then an upward/downward trend
will quickly develop in the cumulative sum. The test plots the sum of the recursive residuals together
with a superior and an inferior frontier that represents the 5% signicance level of the test.
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As we can notice, the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals remains inside the boundaries
during the whole sample period, providing favourable evidence for the stability of the model.
After the model successfully passed the necessary tests to assess its validity, we are now prepared
to evaluate the long-run relationship between the variables through the bounds test approach to coin-
tegration.
5.2.4 Bounds test
According to Pesaran et al (2001), the rst step to apply the bounds test approach to cointegration is
to estimate a conditional error correction mechanism (ECM). The conditional ECM is obtained from
equation (5) by subtracting Ut−1 on both sides of the equation and by adding up and subtracting∑q
j=0 γjxt−1 on the right side of the equation, where xt is a vector of the dependent variables. At the
end, we get:







νi∆GKt−i + εt (6)
where α0 is a constant, t is a time trend, and εt is a white noise error term.
To assess cointegration between variables, the hyphotesis H0 : π1 = ... = π6 = 0 needs to be
opposed against the hyphotesis H1 : π1 6= ... 6= π6 6= 0 , where H0 stands for the absence of a long-run
relationship and H1 stands for the presence of a long-run relationship.
The standard procedure to test for the joint signicance of the coecients involves computing the
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F-statistic and comparing its value with the critical value taken from the F-distribution. However, this
methodology is not valid for the ECM model as the endogeneity of regressors makes OLS biased.
To overcome this diculty, Pesaran et al. (2001) supply bounds on the critical values for the
asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic. They provide lower and upper bounds on the critical values.
The lower bound is based on the assumption that all of the variables are I(0), and the upper bound is
based on the assumption that all of the variables are I(1). Actually, the truth may be somewhere in
between these two polar extremes.
If the computed F-statistic falls below the lower bound, we conclude that no cointegration exists.
If the F-statistic surpasses the upper bound, we conclude that we have cointegration. Lastly, if the
F-statistic falls between the bounds, the test is inconclusive.
Table 5: Bounds Test
H0: No LR relationship exists
Statistic




Critical values for a 5% level of signicance
The value of the test statistic allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration with 5%
of signicance. That provides a strong evidence for a long-run relationship between the variables
contained in the ECM.
A complementary strategy to conrm the result of cointegration consists of looking at the behaviour
of the estimated residuals taken from the static model. If estimated residuals appear to be stationary,
this situation favours the conclusion of cointegration. We can obtain the estimated residuals (v̂t) by
estimating the following equation:
v̂t = Ut − Θ̂0 − Θ̂1t − Θ̂2GKt − Θ̂3GEPLt − Θ̂4GRRt − Θ̂5UDt − Θ̂6EMSt (7)
After obtaining the estimated residuals series, we may perform the ADF unit root test. The test
results clearly show evidence of stationarity, by rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 1%
signicance level  see test results in table 12 in the Appendix. For an additional conrmation, we can
look at the cronogram of the estimated residuals:
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As we can notice, the cronogram also suggests that estimated residuals are stationary, since their
mean and the variance appear to be constant. This evidence conrms the result of cointegration
achieved by bounds test.
5.2.5 Long-run coecients
The long-run model can be derived from the conditional ECM presented above in equation (6). It is
presented as a static model with the following specication:
Ut = Θ0 + Θ1t + Θ2GKt + Θ3GEPLt + Θ4GRRt + Θ5UDt + Θ6EMSt + vt (8)
where Θn are the long-run coecients computed as follows: Θ0 = α0/π1, Θ1 = α1/π1,Θn = πn/π1,
n = 2, ..., 6 and εt is a white noise error term.
The following table summarizes the results of the model:
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However, long-run coecients per se do not provide any conclusive answer to my research pro-
posal. To know whether NAIRU is exogenous or endogenous relative to capital accumulation I need to
determine their individual signicance. Unfortunately, we are unable to perform such statistical tests
due to the biasedness of the OLS estimator in the context of conditional ECM model.
To surpass this obstacle, we will follow the recommendation made by Pesaran and Shin (1998) and
build an ECM according to the transformation proposed by Bewley (1979).
5.2.6 Bewley transformation
Bewley (1979) recommended an ECM transformation which has the advantage of explicitly estimating
the long-run coecients. Taking the general form of the ARDL model dispalyed in equation (3) as a
starting point,








jxt + εt (9)
we simply need to subtract
∑p
i=1 βiyt on both sides of the equation and sum and subtract
∑q
j=0 γjxt
on the right side of the equation to perform the Bewley's transformation. At the end, we may express
it as follows:











jxt−j + εt (10)
Applying that transformation to our ARDL model, we achieve the following regression structure:
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ψt−i∆GKt−i + εt (11)
This ECM specication, however, cannot be directly estimated by OLS. The inclusion of the con-
temporaneous rst dierence on the right-hand side of the equation (∆Ut) creates endogeneity, a
situation in which one of the regressors is correlated with the error term, making the OLS estimator
biased5.
To overcome this obstacle, we need to estimate the equation through Instrumental Variables (IV).
This estimation method consists of replacing the endogenous variable (∆Ut) with an instrumental
variable (Z) which has to satisfy two conditions: 1) Be correlated with the endogenous variable
[COV (Z,∆Ut) 6= 0] and 2) Be uncorrelated with the error term [COV (Z, εt) = 0]. Bewley (1979)
proposes using the lagged value of the dependent variable as instrumental variable (Z = Ut−1). He
also shows that, under these conditions, the estimated long-run coecients are equivalent to the ones
computed from the conditional ECM.
To sum up, we are going to estimate Bewley's ECM through Instrumental variables for two main
reasons: rst, it provides explicit values of the coecients and of its standard-errors and second it
allows for directly testing the individual signicance of the regressors, an essential procedure to assess
my research question. The IV estimator chosen was the two-stage least squares (2SLS).
The estimation results are displayed in the following table:
5Another possible source of concern would be the presence of serial correlation in the error term. However, we have
already ruled out that possibility.
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*, ** and *** denote signicance at ten, ve and one percent level
5.2.7 Discussion of Results
In a rst look at the results, we can easily verify that the long-run coecients estimated through 2SLS
are equal to the ones computed from the conditional ECM estimated by OLS (λi = Θi). For a proof,
see Wickens and Breusch (1988).
All variables coecients display the expected signs with the exception of GRR. In fact, results
suggest that an increase inGRR generates a decrease in the unemployment rate. A possible explanation
for this surprising result may be related to the automatic stabilizer eect of unemployment benets,
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which smooths the economic cycle uctuations by providing income to unemployed workers during
recessions. Nevertheless, we must not pay too much attention to this relationship since the variable is
not statistically signicant.
GKis highly signicant. At one percent signicance level, we estimate that an 1% increase in capital
accumulation causes a long-run decrease of 1,2121 percentage points in the unemployment rate.
On the other hand, none of the institutional variables are signicant even at a ve percent level.
Only GEPL shows to be signicant if we extend the level of signicance to ten percent. Moreover,
the wald test shows that the institutional variables GEPL, GRR and UD are not jointly signicative
at 5% - see table 12 in the Appendix.
In short, the results clearly support the Keynesian hyphotesys showing a highly signicant long-
run relationship between capital accumulation and unemployment. Moreover, the results are broadly
unsupportive of the exogenous NAIRU hypothesis, since it has been shown that the institutional
variables are jointly not signicative.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this thesis was to assess the impact of labour market variables and capital accumulation
on the long-run unemployment of the Portuguese economy during the 1985-2013 period. By studying
this relationship, we wanted to verify the consistency between the labour market reforms included in
the Troika memorandum and the past behaviour of the Portuguese labour market. Results favourable
to the importance of the labour market institutional variables would be supportive of the approach
taken by Troika, as well of the exogenous NAIRU that theoretically underlies it. On the other hand,
results sustaining the importance of capital accumulation and the lack of relevance of the labour market
variables would be supportive of the endogenous NAIRU theory, revealing the absence of empirical
support for the structural reforms that have been implemented.
We are aware of the limitations of this retrospective research exercise: the study can be assertive
in stressing the inconsistency between the reforms proposed by Troika and the historical behaviour of
the Portuguese labour market but cannot present any conclusive answer regarding the eective impact
of those measures in the future long-run unemployment. That answer can only be addressed by future
research considering the developments of the labour market in subsequent years. Even so, we argue
that our approach remains meaningful, since it is not reasonable to apply a policy strategy which fails
to be coherent with the past behaviour of the economic eld that it intends to reform.
The results of the econometric estimation do not support the exogenous NAIRU theory. Out of
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the three institutional variables tested, just one of them proved to be individually signicant at 10%
level. Moreover, the institutional variables are jointly not signicant at 5% level. In contrast, the
estimation showed a strong inverse long-run relationship between unemployment and capital accumu-
lation, statistically signicant at 1% level. Thus, the results are supportive of the endogenous NAIRU
theory, by suggesting that aggregate demand is the main determinant of the long-run unemployment,
contradicting the usual assumption that potential output is invariant to demand shocks.
To sum up, this thesis conclude that the labour market structural reforms proposed by the Troika
were inadequate because they were based upon a theoretical framework (exogenous NAIRU model)
that was not representative of the Portuguese labour market.
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A Appendix
Figure 4: Labour Market Equilibrium
Figure 5: Negative Demand Shock without Hysteresis
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Figure 6: Negative Demand Shock with Hysteresis
Table 8: Data Sources
Original Time Series Data Source
U Unemployment rate Bank of Portugal
GFC Gross Fixed Capital Formation Bank of Portugal
NMW Nominal Minimum wage INE (Statistics Portugal)
CPI Consumer Price Index INE (Statistics Portugal)
SEPR Strict Employment Protection Legislation of Regular Workers OECD
SEPT Strict Employment Protection Legislation of Temporary Workers OECD
REGPROP Proportion of regular workers in the employed population Pordata
TEMPROP Proportion of temporary workers in the employed population Pordata
TOT Terms of Trade OECD
GDP Gross Domestic Product Bank of Portugal
EX Exports Bank of Portugal
IM Imports Bank of Portugal
UD Union Density OECD
GRR Gross Replacement Rate OECD
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Table 9: Composite Variables
GK log(GFC)
RMW NMW/CPI
EPL SEPR ∗REGPROP + SEPT ∗ TEMPROP
GEPL log(RMW ∗ EPL)
TO (EX + IM)/GDP
EMS log(TO ∗ TOT )
Figure 7: Plots
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations
U 7.39 6.59 17.08 3.50 3.14 116
GK 8.21 8.22 11.23 4.09 1.95 116
GEPL 1848.97 1862.50 2008.72 1437.27 107.09 116
GRR 36.87 39.00 45.00 22.00 5.23 116
UD 25.39 22.52 45.71 17.96 6.73 116
EMS 4.32 4.29 4.51 4.19 0.07 116
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standart-errors between parentheses ()
Table 12: Wald Test
H0: λ3 = λ4 = λ5 = 0
Statistic
F − Stat ∼ F(2,104) 8.0134
(0.2334)
F-statistic is reported; p− values between parentheses
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Table 13: Unit Root Test - ADF Test
H0: There is a Unit Root
Statistic
ADF − Stat −3.8737
(0.0031)
ADF-statistic is reported; p− values between parentheses
Lag Length: 4
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